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THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S MENS REA REQUIREMENT:
ESTABLISHING A "BRIGHTER LINE" TEST
United States v. Sinskey'
by Douglas L. McHoney
I. INTRODUCTION
ThisEighth Circuit Court of
Appeal's decision is a case of first
impression in its jurisdiction and
examines the mens rea requirement
of the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
The Eighth Circuit avoids the diffi-
culties other jurisdictions have en-
countered when interpreting the
"knowingly" requirement by devel-
oping a "brighter line" test. As a
result ofthis "brighter line" test, both
companies and the officers who
work for them will have major in-
centives to avoid violations of the
CWA while still maintaining protec-
tion from over prosecution.
H. FACTS AND HOLDING
John Morrell & Co.
("Morrell"), a large meat-packing
plant in Sioux Falls, South Dakota,
created a substantial amount of
wastewater throughout the packag-
ing process.2 Some of this waste-
water went to a sewage treatment
plant, and the rest was treated at
Morrell's own wastewater treat-
ment plant ("WWTP").3 The pri-
mary function of the WWTP was
to decrease the amount of ammo-
nia nitrogen in the water before it
discharging it into the river.4
The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") issued a per-
mit for the WWTP under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"), requiring the
company to not only limit the
amount ofthe ammonia nitrogen to
specified levels, but also to perform
weekly tests monitoring the
CWA's Mens Rea Requirement
amounts.- I He permit also required
that Morrell file monthly discharge-
monitoring reports concerning the
results ofthese tests.
In the spring of 1991,
Morrell doubled the number of
hogs slaughtered at the plant.' The
increase caused the level of ammo-
nia nitrogen in the discharged wa-
ter to exceed that allowed by the
CWA permit.' To compensate,
Morrell manipulated the testing pro-
cess so that it would appear to be
within the permitted limits.'o One
technique employed was "flow ma-
nipulation" or the "flow game.""
The technique was to discharge low
levels before the weekly testing. 2
Once the tests were completed,
Morrell would discharge an ex-
ceedingly high level of ammonia ni-
trogen. '"
In addition, Morrell em-
ployed the "selective sampling"
technique." This involved perform-
ing more than the number of tests
required by the EPA, but only re-
porting those test results that re-
flected levels below the permissible
limits. " Finally, when either ofthese
techniques failed to produce ac-
'119 F.3d712 (8th Cir. 1997).
2 Sinskey, 119 F.3dat 714.














ceptable results, Morrell simply fal-
sified the tests' results and the
monthly EPA reports.' 6 Timothy
Sinskey signed these reports and
sent them to the EPA.
As a result ofthese actions,
Sinskey, the plant manager, and
Wayne Kumm, the plant engineer,
were charged with criminal viola-
tions ofthe CWA. 7 The jury found
both Sinskey and Kumm guilty of
knowingly rendering an inaccurate
monitoring method required under
the CWA." The jury also found
Sinskey guilty of knowingly dis-
charging a pollutant into waters in
amounts exceeding those permitted
by the CWA.'9 Both men appealed
their convictions to the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.20
Sinskey and Kumm based
their appeal on several issues."
First, the trial court gave an instruc-
'
6 id.
18 1d The Court held that the men violated 13 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4).
19 Sinskev, 119 F.3d at 714. This was in direct violation of 13 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(a).
20 d
21 Id Sinskey appealed several other points beyond the scope of this Casenote. Sinskey contended that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting Milbauer's secret logs because, he claimed, the logs did not meet the requisite stan-
dards of accuracy and reliability for scientific evidence. Id. at 717. Further, Sinskey asserted error in the trial court's
decision not to grant his motion seeking to limit the government's ability to cross-examine an unindicted co-conspirator.
Id Kumm also appealed several other points beyond the scope of this casenote. Kumm contended that the government's
evidence was insufficient to establish he affirmatively participated in the deceit either directly or by aiding and abetting
those who did. Id at 718. Kumm also asserted that the jury instructions were incorrect because he had no duty to report
the violations and to intervene to stop their continuation. Id. at 718-19. Kumm contended that the prosecutor's closing
argument alleged incorrectly certain legal duties of Kumm. Id. at 719. Finally, Kunm contended that the prosecutor
misstated the law in regards to the knowledge requirement. Id See infra note 26.
22 Sinskev. 119F.3dat715.
23 id.
24 Id See infra for the statutory
language.
2 1Id at 717.
26 id.
27Id. The Eighth Circuit also held that admitting the secret logs was within the trial court's discretion. Id. In addition, the
Court held that because the witness could have invoked his fifth amendment privilege after direct examination, the trial
court did not error in denying Sinskey's motion to limit the government's ability to cross-examine. Id at 718. The Eighth
tion that for the jury to find that
Sinskey had acted "knowingly," the
government must have shown that
Sinskey was "aware of the nature
of his acts, peform[ed] them inten-
tionally, and [did] not act or fail to
act through ignorance, mistake or
accident."n Further, the instructions
told the jury that Sinskey did not
have to know that his acts violated
the CWA or permits issued under
that act.' Sinskey contended that
because the word "knowingly" im-
mediately precedes the word "vio-
lates" in Section 1319(c)(2XA), the
government had to prove that he
knew his conduct violated the CWA
or the permit.24
Second, Sinskey and
Kumm challenged the trial court's
instructions with respect to their vio-
lation of Section 1319(c)(4).' The
men argued that the government
should have been required to prove
that they knew their acts were ille-
gal."
The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in affirming the district
court's decision, held that the
"knowingly" requirement in both
statutes required only that Sinskey
and Kumm had knowledge of the
relevant activities, not that they
knew their activities violated the
law. 27
MH. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Clean Water Act
In 1948, Congress first
provided funding to municipalities
in an attempt to control water pol-
lution when it passed the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.28
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's,
as environmental awareness in-
creased, the government introduced
regulations controlling the amount
of pollutants in waterways. 29 The
Clean Water Act, as it is now titled,
reached its current form after
amendments by Congress in 1972
and subsequently in 1977:1
The purpose of the CWA
was to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological
integrity ofthe Nation's waters."
The CWAuses a technology-based
approach where all discharges are
required to adhere to federal regu-
lations. 2 The National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") is the centerpiece of
the regulatory scheme, regulating
the pollution through permits," The
NPDES requires that anyone dis-
charging pollutants into the nation's
waters must obtain a permit from
the EPA.' In order to implement
the standards stated in the CWA
and EPA regulations," the NPDES
limits the quantity or concentration
of pollutants a facility may dis-
charge. 6 Within these regulations,
Congress provided methods of en-
forcement, which have become
more severe over the past several
decades, including civil, criminal and
administrative penalties, to help
reach the goals as provided in the
CWA.37
B. The "Knowingly" Require-
ment
The mens rea element ofthe
CWA has caused controversy
throughout not only the court sys-
tem, but also the entire environmen-
tal field. Section 1319(c)(2)(A)
provides that, "Any person who
Circuit also found that the evidence supported a verdict that Kunun aided and abetted the misleading monitoring scheme
by encouraging Greenwood to render inaccurate monitoring methods and discouraging him from complaining about it to
others at the WWTP Id. For these same reasons, the court found that the jury instructions regarding his duty to report
were not incorrect. Id at 719. Further, the court held that the prosecutor's closing arguments referred only to Kumm's job
duties, not legal duties. Id Finally, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the trial court's jury instructions limited any harm caused
by the prosecutor's misstated the law in regards to the knowledge requirement. Id
28 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). The original statute has evolved through
numerous amendments. See infra note 30 and accompanying text for the most dramatic amendment.29 See Patrick W. Ward, The Criminal Provisions of the Clean Water Act as Interpreted by the Judiciary and the Result-
ing Response from the Legislature, 5 DICK. J. ENvrL. L. & Pol'Y 399 (1996).30 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 95-217, '2, 91 Stat. 1566. Codified as amended in
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.
3133 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1972).
32 Mary J. Houghton, The Clean WaterActAmendments of 1987: A BNA SpecialReport, ENV'T REP., Sept. 4. 1987, at 2.
33 Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea and the "Heightened Criminal Liability" Imposed on Holators ofthe Clean Jtater
Act, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 377,380 (1996).
3 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(c) (1997). 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) prohibits the discharge of "pollutants" into waters by any "person"
without an NPDES permit. "Person" includes any individual, corporation, municipality, or corporate officer. 33 U.S.C. §§
1319(c)(6), 1362(5). "Pollutant" refers to any solid and other waste, sewage sludge, heat, rock sand. biological and
radioactive materials. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
35 See 40C.F.R. §§ 131(1), 1221(a) (1994).
3 6Wettach, supra note 33, at 380.
37 Houghton, supra note 32, at 15-16.
38See Ward, supra note 29, at 399.
39 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A)-(B) (1997).
CWA's Mens Rea Requirement
kmowingly violates.. this title, or any
pemit condition or limitation.. shall
be punished by a fine of not less
than $5,000 nor more than $50,000
per day of violation, or by impris-
onment for not more than 3 years,
or by both" (emphasis added)." In
Section 1319(c)(4), Congress
states that, "Any person who
Imowingly makes any false mate-
rial statement, representation, or
certification in any application,
record, report... or other document
required to be maintained under this
chapter or who knowingly
falsifies... or renders inaccurate any
monitoring device...shall be pun-
ished by a fine of not more than
$10,000, or by imprisonment for





the CWA, the government has had
the power to impose criminal sanc-
tions on violators." In 1972, Con-
gress provided for enforcement of
penalties for willful or negligent vio-
lations ofthe CWA through penal-
ties of $2,500 to $25,000 per day
of violation, prison sentences ofup
to two years, or both.42 In addition,
the government could require a per-
son who knowingly made false
statements to pay a fine of up to
$10,000, serve up to six months in
jail, or both.43 However, Congress
recently amended the CWA to en-
hance these criminal provisions and
increase the criminal sanctions on
violators.4
ligent violations and assigned differ-
ent penalties to each,' Most sig-
nificantly, Congress changed the
word "willfully" to "knowingly" in
order to classify the violations as
felonies.4 7 Because the use of the
term "willfilly" in a criminal statute
generally requires polluters to know
their conduct violated the law, the
change of the term reflects
Congress's desires to end this re-
quirement." Consequently, the cur-
rent tougher penalties increased
both the maximum fine and the
amount oftime that can be spent in
jail.49 Both Section 1319(c)(2)(A)
and 1319(c)(4) double the poten-
tial fines and prison time for a sec-
ond offense. 0
The preamble to the 1987
and permits and causes a publicly
owned treatment works to violate
any effluent limitation or condition
in any permit issued to the treatment
works under section 402 of the
Act." 2 The House Report stated
that Congress intended to "amend
section 309 ofthe [CWA] to pro-
vide penalties for dischargers or in-
dividuals who knowingly or negli-
gently violate or cause the violation
of certain of the Act's require-
ments." In ajoint conference re-
port, the House and the Senate only
discussed the change in the crimi-
nal penalties caused by the amend-
ments." The lack of an explanation
regarding the change in the
provision's language reflects
Congress's desire only to
The recent amendments to amendments reveals Congress's strengthen the penalties and not al-
the CWA have not only expanded intent in amending the above pro- ter the interpretation of the term
the behavior subject to criminal visions." The Senate Report stated "knowingly.""
penalties, but also increased the that "criminal liability shall also at-
severity of the penalties.' The tach to any person who is not in 2. Public Welfare Offense
Water Quality Act Amendments of compliance with all applicable Fed- Doctrine
1987 separated intentional and neg- eral, State and local requirements The public welfare offense
-o3 3 U.S. C. § 1319(c)(4) (1997).
t Wettacht supra note 3w3h at 38 1.
4
'33 USC § 1319(c)(1) (1986).
411d. § 1319(c)(2).
4 H.R. Rep. No. 961. 104th Cong. (1987). Codified as amended at 3 3 U. S. C § § 131 9(c)(2) and 13 19(c)(4).
SWettachi supra note 3a3p. at 3 F1.
461d. at 382.
47 Water Quality Act of 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-4. 101 Stat. 7 (198 7) amending 3 3 U. S. C. § 1319(c).
4 1 See United States v Hopkins, 5 3 F. 3d 53 3, 5 39 (2d Cir 199 5); H. R. Couf. Rep. No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 8(1986).
4 9See supra notes 39 and 40. (33 U.S.C. §§ 13 19(c)(2)(A) and (c)(4). See supra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text for
the new increased amounts.
"0 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(2)(A)-(B), 1319(c)(4) (1998).
51 Wettach. supra note 33, at 389.
42 1d Citing S. Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., st Sess. 29(1985).
"Id, citing R Rep. No. 189, 99th Cong., st Sess. 29(1985).
4
, citing H.R Conf. Rep. No. 10049. 9thCong. 2d Sess. (1986).
5Wettach, supra note 33, at 390.
CWA's Mens Rea Requirement
doctrine states that knowledge of
the act itself is sufficient moral cul-
pability for conviction under envi-
ronmental regulations. 6 Neither
knowledge ofthe actual statute nor
knowledge of the existence of any
statute is required."
The principle case in this
area is United States v. Interna-
tional Minerals & Chem. Corp."
The Supreme Court held that the
"knowingly" language required the
government to prove that the de-
fendant knew of the nature of the
acts, not that the defendant knew
his actions violated the applicable
statute." The Court applied what
is known as the public welfare of-
fense doctrine when it stated
that "where... dangerous or delete-
rious devices or products or obnox-
ious waste materials are involved,
the probability of regulation is so
great that anyone who is aware that
he is in possession ofthem or deal-
ing with them must be presumed to
be aware ofthe regulation."
3. Relevant Precedent
Appeals courts throughout
the nation have seen a variety of
cases pertaining to the mens rea el-
ement of the CWA.6' The courts
have consistently held that the
CWA's criminal enforcement pro-
visions require only that polluters
knew of their actions, not the rel-
evant law.62 More significantly, to
be guilty, these criminal defendants
did not need to act with a specific
intent to violate the law. 6
The Eighth Circuit dealt
6Brad A. Gordon, Criminal Knowledge and the New Clean Air Act: PotentialJudicial Constructions, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
427,437 (1993). The Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, and the Federal Insecticide. Fungicide
and Rodentcide Act have provisions for "knowing" criminal violations that employ the public welfare offense doctrine.
Ward, supra note 28, at 406. For a complete historical perspective of the public welfare offense doctrine. See Katherine H.
Setness, Statutory Interpretation of Clean Water Act Section 1319(c) (2)(A) 's Knowledge Requirement: Reconciling the
Needs ofEnvironmental and Criminal Law, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 447, 459 (1996).
57 Gordon, supra note 55, at 437.
" 402 U.S. 558 (1971). The Supreme Court interpreted a provision of the Federal Explosives Act, which imposes misde-
meanor penalties on any individual who "knowingly violates any .. regulation" promulgated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission of the safe transportation of corrosive liquids. Id. at 559.
59 Id. at 565.
6 id.
61 See United States v. Schallom, 998 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1993) ("'knowingly' means that the defendant acted voluntarily and
intentionally and not because of mistake, accident, or other innocent reason."); United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27 (1st
Cir. 1992) (regarding a violation of Section 1319(c)(3)(A)); United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1991) (dealing with the pre-1987 amendment statute); United Statesv. Frezzo Brothers, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa.
1978) aff'd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979) (permitted factual evidence to establish willful actions regardless of knowledge of
statute or that actions violated statute); and United States v. Hamel, 557 F.2d 107 (6th Cir 1977) (allowed circumstantial
evidence). For a complete analysis on these and other cases, see also Wettach, supra note 32, at 390-93.
62 Wettach, supra note 33, at 392.
63 id.
6"69 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 1995) (analyzing a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)).
65 Id. at 892-93.
6 Id.
67 id.
with the issue of general versus spe-
cific intent when interpreting a
criminal statue in United States v.
Farrell." In Farrell, the Court ana-
lyzed a statute that penalizes any-
one who "knowingly violates" a
statute that prohibits the transfer or
possession of an automatic
weapon.6 The court determined
that the term "knowingly" only ap-
plied to the conduct prohibited by
statute, not the illegal nature ofthe
activities." It was thus held that the
term "knowingly" modified the acts
constituting the underlying conduct,
thus not requiring the government
to prove that the defendant knew
his actions were illegal.67
In Ratzlaf v. United
States, the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed a "willful violation," thus dis-
Vol. 6 *No.1
tinguishing it from the statute that is
the subject of this casenote.6' The
Court held that the term "willfully"
required that the defendant be
aware of the illegality of his actions
in order for a crime to be commit-
ted.6' The Ratzlaf Court also held
that a term that appears in a statute
at more than one point should be
construed the same way each
time.70
In United States v.
Ahmad, the Fifth Circuit held that
the environmental laws do not im-
pose strict criminal liability.71 In
Ahmad, a convenience store owner
discharged gasoline into a city
sewer system. 72 At trial, the defen-
dant asserted that he thought he was
discharging water, not gasoline, and
ultimately was not convicted.7 The
court reasoned that the Act "uni-
formly requires knowledge as to
each of the elements rather than
only one or two." The dourt con-
cluded that to hold Ahmad guilty
would subject mere accidents or
other lawful conduct to harsh crimi-
nal penalties.
4. Hopkins and Weitzenhoff
Two recent Court of Ap-
peals cases in other districts have
addressed the precise issue pre-
sented the Sinskey case. The
Weitzenhoff case regarded the
criminal charges oftwo officers who
ordered employees to pump waste
activated sludge directly into the
ocean on 40 different occasions in
violation of Section 1319(c)(2)(A)
of the CWA." The Weitzenhoff
court held that it would impose
sanctions on a person "who know-
ingly engages in conduct that results
in a permit violation, regardless of
whether the polluter is cognizant of
the requirements or even the exist-
ence of the permit." The court
based its decision on the public
welfare offense doctrine as stated
in International Minerals and the
legislative history from the 1987
amendments.'
In United States v.
Hopkins, the Second Circuit made
a decision pertaining to Section
1319(c)(2)(A) of the CWA.o In
Hopkins, the defendant's corpora-
tion generated a substantial amount
oftoxic waste water." Its NPDES
permit required the corporation to
take samples ofthe water and send
them to an independent laboratory
for analysis.' Hopkins instructed his
employees that ifthe levels did not
meet the requisite standards, they
should either not send the samples,
take them the next day, or dilute
them with water. 83 The court relied
upon the public welfare offense doc-
trine and prior examination ofenvi-
ronmental legislation under the
CWAin holding that the government
only needed prove that Hopkins
knew of the nature of his acts and
that he performed them intention-
ally, not that he knew the acts vio-
" 114 S.Ct. 655(1994) (pertaining to Section 5324 of the Money Laundering Control Act). For a detailed analysis of the
Ratzlafcase, see Setness, supra note 55, at 468.
'
9 Id at 657.
70 Id. at 660.
7 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996). For a comprehensive analysis of theAhmad case, see David Gerger, Fifth Circuit Rejects
Strict Criminal Liabilitv for Pollution. 34-JUN Hous. LAW. 32, (1997); Stanley A. Twardy, Jr. & Michael G. Considine,fWhatlust One "Know To Be Convicted Under the Environmental Laws?, 11-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 48 (1997).





7 6 United States v Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir 1993); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995). For further
analysis and comparison see Ward, supra note 28, at 406, and Setness, supra note 55, at 481.
" JJkitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1281.
7 1 Id. at 1284.
7 Id. at 1283-86.
s0 Hopkins. 53 F.3dat 534.
81 Id
82 Id at 535.
83 id
CWA's Mens Rea Reauirement
lated the CWA."N
IV. INSTANT DECISION
U.S. v. Sinskey first
brought the issue of the definition
of "knowingly" in the CWA con-
text to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals." Sinskey was found guilty
of knowingly discharging a pollut-
ant into waters of the United States
in amounts exceeding CWA permit
limitations in violation of Section
1319(c)(2)(A)."6 Sinskey claimed
that a prerequisite to a conviction
was proving he knew his actions
violated either the CWA or the
NPDES permit." In deciding this
issue, the Eighth Circuit analyzed
generally accepted constructions of
the word "knowingly" in criminal
statutes, the CWA's legislative his-
tory, and other case history that has
addressed this issue. 88
The court first looked at
"Id. at 536-41.
" Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 715.
86 id
87,d.
United States v. Farrell", an
Eighth Circuit decision analyzing the
"knowingly" element in a statute
governing illegal possession of a
machine gun.90 The Farrell court
held that the conviction did not re-
quire that the defendant knew that
his actions violated the law, only that
the defendant knowingly commit-
ted the act of transferring or pos-
sessing a machine gun." Based on
this logic, the court found that the
Section 13 19(c)(2(A) "knowingly"
requirement applied only to the un-
derlying conduct prohibited by the
statute."
Next, the court addressed
the conduct that Sinskey must have
known was occurring. While the
court initially recognized that the
conduct required might appear to
be the violation of a permit limita-
tion, this would require that Sinskey
knew of the permit limitation and
88 Id.
8969 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 1995). The court also cited United States v Hem, 926 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1991).
9 Sinskey, 119 F. 3d at 715. The relevant machine gun possession statute was 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).






9 Id The court said that, for example, Sinskey had to have known that Morrell was discharging ammonia nitrates that
were higher than one part per million. Id
98Sinske.v, 119 F.3d at 716 (citing Cheekv. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604. 609. 112 L.Ed.2d617 (1991)).
9 Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 716 (citing United States v. International Mineral & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558.91 S.Ct. 1697. 29
L.Ed2d 178(1971)). See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
'"'Sinskey, 119F.3dat 716.
knew that he was violating it.' In-
stead the court reasoned that to vio-
late a permit limitation, one must
engage in the conduct prohibited by
the statute." The court concluded
that the "permit is.. another layer of
regulation in the nature of a law, in
this case, a law that applies only to
Morrell."6 Because ofthis, the un-
derlying conduct that Sinskey must
have known was that conduct pro-
hibited by the permit.I
The Eighth Circuit said that
this interpretation comported with
our legal system's general rule that
ignorance ofthe law is no excuse."
Further, the court noted that this in-
terpretation is consistent with past
Supreme Court interpretations of
statutes containing similar language
and structure.9
The court then addressed
the act's legislative history.'" The
Eighth Circuit noted that in 1987,
Vol. 6 +No.1
Congress changed the word "will-
fully" to "knowingly".'Io It sought
to broaden the application of the
statute and ultimately increase de-
terrence by strengthening criminal
sanctions for the violations.'02 The
court held that this change de-
creased the mens rea requirement
from having acted with the knowl-
edge that one's conduct violates the
law, to simply having acted with an
awareness of one's actions. 03
The Eighth Circuit next dis-
cussed other courts' decisions on
the same issue. 10'1 The Court cited
both Hopkins'" and
Weitzenhoff0 as decisions that
were consistent with the court's in-
terpretation of Section
1319(c)(2)(A).'0 7 The court also
'
01Sinskey, 119F.3d at 716. See 133 Cong. Recd.H131 (daily ed. Jan. 7,1987) (statement of Rep. J. Howard), reprintedin
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5,28, and 33 U.S.C. § 1319, historical and statutory notes, 1987 amendment, at 197 (West supp. 1997).
'
02 Id See H.R Cont. Rep. No. 99-1004 at 138(1986) and S.Rep. No. 99-50 at 29-30(1985).
'o3 'Sinskev. 119 F.3d at 716. The court compared Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201, with InternationalMinerals, 402 U.S. at 562-63.
The court also cited Babbittv. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687,696-97, 115 S.Q. 2407,2412, 132 L.Ed.2d
597(1995) and Hern, 926 F2d 767.
'0" Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 716.
1o United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 541 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1072, 116 S.Ct. 773, 133 L.Ed.2d725
(1996).. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
' United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1283-86 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128, 115 S.Ct. 939, 130L.Ed.2d
884 (1995). See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
07 Sinskev, 119 F.3dat 716.
08Id (citing United States v. Ahmad. 101 F.3d 386(5th Cir. 1996)). See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
'
09 Sinskev. 119 F.3d at 717.
no Id.
"' Id (citing Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 541, United States v. Enochs, 857 F.2d 491, 492-94 (8th Cir 1988), and United States v.
Udofot, 711 F2d 831. 837 (8th Cir. 1983).
12510 U.S. 135. 143. 114 S.Q. 655,660, 126 L.Ed2d615 (1994).
"
3 Sinskev, 119 F.3dat 717.
11 id.
distinguished Smskey's case from
Ahmad, the Fifth Circuit case that
dealt with a mistake of fact defense,
not a mistake of law 0
Regarding Sinskey and
Kumm's violation of Section
1319(c)(4), the Eighth Circuit
noted that in the plain language of
the statute, the adverb "knowingly"
directly "precedes and explicitly
modifies the verbs that describe the
activities that violate the act."1" As
a result of this language, the court
concluded that Sinskey and
Kumm's "knowingly" argument had
even less force.110 The court cited
several cases that support the ar-
gument that the term "knowingly"
only referred to knowledge of the
relevant activities."' Further, in
Ratzlaj v. United StatesII the
Supreme Court ruled that a term
that appears in a statute more than
once should be consistently con-
strued."'
The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, affirming the district
court's decision, held that the
"knowingly" requirement in both
statutes does not require that
Sinskey and Kumm knew of the il-
legal nature oftheir conduct, only
that they were knowledgeable ofthe
relevant activities. 1 14
V. COMMENT
Since the amendments to
the CWA in 1987, the United
States Courts of Appeals have
heard three cases regarding the
CWA's Mens Rea Requirement
mens rea requirement for Section
1319 of the CWA. United States
v. Sinskey presented an issue of
first impression to the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. While prior
cases may have lacked in their rea-
soning and their application of leg-
islative history and case prece-
dence, Sinskey appears to use
sound logic while ultimately reach-
ing a result that will further the goals
ofthe CWA.
While both the
Weitzenhoff and Hopkins deci-
sions concurred that knowledge of
the law is not an essential element
to a prosecution under Section
.1319(c)(2)(A) of the CWA, the
cases have been criticized because
they fail to address the role of the
rule of lenity and its use in relation-
ship to legislative history."' Specifi-
cally, T&Tetzenhoff was criticized for
citing another subsection of the
CWA and its lack of discussion of
the changes that the 1987 amend-
ments had on the CWA." 6 The
Hopkins court, on the other hand,
did discuss the change of language
caused by the 1987 amendment, but
failed to explain how the change
should translate into the specific acts
to be proven."
In the Sinskey case, the
court used the legislative history,
specifically the 1987 amendment,
simply to establish that the term
"knowingly" means "acting with an
awareness of one's actions."" 8 The
court made no attempt to use the
legislative history to establish the
actions of which a defendant must
be aware.
Another noted fault of the
Weitzenhoff and Hopkins deci-
sions was failing to consider
whether some CWA violations
might fall outside of the scope of
the public welfare offense doc-
trine."' A criticism was that the
cases were "impermissibly vague"
about the prima facia case that the
government must prove to sustain
a criminal conviction. 2 0 Both the
Wietzenhoff and Hopkins deci-
sions failed to address whether
some CWA violations might fall
outside ofthe public welfare offense
doctrine.121
The Eighth Circuit, on the
other hand, is more deliberate in its
application of the public welfare
offense doctrine. The court stated
that the International Minerals
court focused on the nature of the
regulatory scheme at issue, noting
that where dangerous substances
are at issue, anyone dealing with
these substances should be pre-
sumed to be aware of the regula-
tion.122 The Eighth Circuit thus con-
cluded that such reasoning should
apply to the CWA, which regulates
the discharge into the nation's wa-
ters of such "obnoxious waste ma-
terial" as the byproducts of slaugh-
tered animals.123
The court protected the
public welfare offense doctrine's
far-reaching interest when it stated
that the doctrine should apply to the
CWA as a whole, because the Act
regulates the discharge of"obnox-
ious waste material"into the nation's
waters. More importantly, the spe-
cific language used in the casel24
seemed to imply that any CWA vio-
lations would fall within the scope
of the doctrine.'5 The court's fail-
ure to address whether some vio-
lations might fall outside the scope
of the public welfare offense doc-
trine appears to be intentional, thus
115 Katherine H. Setness, Statutory Interpretation of Clean Water Act Section 1319(c) (2) (A) Knowledge Requirement:




119 Setness, supra note 115, at 482.
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122 Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 716 (citing InternationalMinerals, 402 U.S. at 558).
123 Id.
'
2 4 Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 716. After reviewing the reasoning ofInternational Minerals, 402 U.S. at 558 (where the Court
held that where "dangerous or... obnoxious waste materials" are present, anyone dealing with the materials "must be
presumed" to be aware of such regulations), the Sinskey Court stated, "Such reasoning applies with equal force, we
believe, to the CWA, which regulates the discharge into the public's water of such 'obnoxious waste material' as the
byproducts of slaughtered animals." Id.
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allowing the inference that the doc-
trine covers all CWA violations.
Ultimately, the Court seemed to
avoid any "impermissibly vague"
language like that for which the other
cases have been criticized.
The Eighth Circuit also
stated that because of the public
welfare offense doctrine applied in
International Mineral, requiring
knowledge only of the underlying
actions would not raise substantive
due process issues.126 Constitu-
tional due process limits the ability
of government to extend criminal
sanctions over the conduct of citi-
zens. 27 The CWA does not violate
due process limits, because it has a
narrow definition ofwhat it consid-
ers criminal.'12 Further, because the
conduct bears a substantial relation-
ship to legitimate public welfare,
safety, and health concerns, courts
rarely question Congress's power
to define mens rea in environmen-
tal statutes and the criminal provi-
sions used to enforce these stat-
utes. 29
Finally, the Weitzenhoff
and Hopkins opinions also have
been criticized for citing "a hodge-
podge of opinions with differing
definitions ofknowledge in support
of [their] holding[s]."' Obviously,
different definitions of knowledge
would ultimately effect the burdens
of production and proof in a given
case.13 1
While the Eighth Circuit
cites a variety of cases throughout
its opinion to support different as-
pects of its analysis, the court fo-
cuses on the reasoning ofFarrell,
a prior Eighth Circuit ruling.3 2 The
court uses the reasoning in Farrell
to conclude that the underlying con-
125 The Hopkins Courts was criticized for stating that "the vast majority of [substances regulated by the CWAJ are of the
type that would alert any ordinary user to the likelihood of stringent regulation," thus implying that some substances
would not alert the user about stringent regulation. Setness, supra note 55, at 482.
126 Sinskev, 119 F.3d at 716.
27 Wettach, supra note 33. at 397.
128 d
129 Id
130 Setness, supra note 115, at 483. Specifically, Setness states that Hopkins makes no distinguish between cases that
require "knowledge of the facts that make the defendant's conduct illegal", knowledge of "the nature of his acts", and
knowledge "that he was discharging the pollutants in question, and knowledge that he "was aware of his acts". Id.
I31 Id.
132 Farrell, 69 F.3dat 891.
133 Sinskey. 119 F3dat 715. The Court stated:
At first glance, the conduct in question might appear to be violating a permit limitation, which would imply that §
1319(c)(2)(A) requires proof that the defendant knew that he or she was violating it. To violate a permit limitation,
however, one must engage in the conduct prohibited by that limitation. The permit is, in essence, another layer of
regulation in the nature of a law, in this case, a law that applies only to Morrel. Id
3- Id. at 715-16.
duct of which Sinskey must have
had knowledge is the conduct that
is prohibited by the permit, not the
terms of the permit itself 33 For
example, Sinskey must only have
been aware that Morrell's dis-
charges of ammonia nitrates were
higher than one part per million in
the summer of 1992.'" The court
determined that the government did
not need to prove that Sinskey
knew that his actions violated the
CWA or NPDES permit, only that
Sinskey was aware of the underly-
ing conduct that resulted in viola-
tion of the permit.13 5 The Eighth
Circuit thus made the first step in
the history of interpreting Section
1319(c)(2)(A) in holding that the
mens rea element is satisfied ifthe
defendant had knowledge of the
underlying conduct that is prohib-
ited by the statute or regulations.
The court then applied this
logic and that ofRatzlafto Section
1319(c)(4). 1 6 The Court held that
"knowingly" refers to knowledge of
the relevant activities, specifically
"the defendants' knowledge that
they were rendering the monitoring
methods inaccurate by aiding and
abetting in the flow games and se-
lective sampling."' 3 As a result of
this, the Eight Circuit established a
"brighter line" test for both Sections
1319(c)(2)(A) and 1319(c)(4). In
the Eighth Circuit, prosecutors who
file these charges and the defen-
dants that these charges are brought
against will have less ambiguities
when faced with allegations of
criminal violations of the CWA.
As a result of these recent
decisions regarding the CWA, aca-
demics have argued that prosecu-
tors are now armed with "a new
arsenal offelony level environmen-
tal crimes and accompanying sanc-
tions" that can be considered "ef-
fective weapons against recalcitrant
environmental violators." 3 8 While
some have argued that this puts too
much power in the hands of pros-
ecutors, the EPA and the Depart-
ment ofJustice's guidelines in case
selection help protect people en-
gaging in truly innocent conduct
6 Id at 717.
37 id
from criminal prosecution. '3
In addition, because of the
narrowed ruling in Sinskey and the
"brighter line"test established within
the decision, corporate officials will
have a greater incentive to not only
learn but also follow the rules es-
tablished by the CWA and the
NPDES. The criminal sanctions that
can be imposed on officers and cor-
porations provide protection from
abuse by companies that simply pay
civil penalties as a cost of doing
business. The corporate officers
who permit or simply allow these
violations to take place will poten-
tially face criminal sanctions. This
will ultimately deter companies from
participating in activities that can
harm the nation's waterways, with-
out exposing these companies to
undue risk from overzealous pros-
ecutors.
CWA's Mens Rea Requirement
1319(c)(4) of the CWA. Conse-
quently, corporations and their of-
ficers will have incentives to follow
the laws established by the CWA
and its regulations or risk severe
criminal sanctions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit's ruling
in Sinskey was based on sound
logic in its analysis of relevant case
law, legislative history, and general
policy issues. Because ofthis sound
logic, the Eighth Circuit established
a "brighter line" test than other ju-
risdictions have established in their
analysis ofthe mens rea requirement
in Sections 1319(c)(2)(A) and
138 John Gibson, The Crime of "Knowing Endangerment" Under the Clean AirAct Amendments of1990: Is itAlfore
"Bark Than Bite" as a Watchdog To Help Safeguard a Workplace Free From Life Threatening Hazardous Air Pollution
Releases, 6 FORDHAM EVNTL. L.J. 197, 201 (1995).
13 See Wettach, supra note 33, at 398 for a complete analysis of prosecutorial discretion through EPA and Department of
Justice guidelines.
